The Fight for Truth — Between Post-Truth and Awakening
The fight for truth is neither an information war nor an awakening movement — it begins where a person recognises their own conceptual confusion and summons the will to think more clearly than the age permits.
Key moments
- 00:00 The age of the post-factual and the truthers
- 05:07 How does the lie enter the world?
- 08:55 Enlightenment or awakening — two models of truth
- 14:17 Schiller: Only error is life
- 43:34 Ethics and truth — the golden rule
- 46:23 The path to truth: the will to truth and the question
- 58:01 Truth is reality
We live in a strange simultaneity. One side declares the age of the post-factual — an era in which truth has become a matter of negotiation, where only the loudest meme wins and facts are merely interpretations anyway. The other side speaks of the great awakening, of a humanity finally opening its eyes, seeing through the lies, finding its way to truth. Both sides claim to hold the correct diagnosis. And neither notices that they are caught in the same trap.
Perhaps you feel it too — an unease that trusts neither narrative. Not because you lack orientation, but because you sense that the question of truth runs deeper than the quarrel between factions. That feeling has a reason. It shows you something essential: the fight for truth begins where the individual stops outsourcing their thinking to others.
Why is the question of truth a question of survival?
Without a concept of truth and reality, you become existentially disoriented. The so-called post-truth era is not a philosophical insight but — one must name it plainly — a PR strategy in which only the loudest meme wins. Where the standard by which something can be measured as important or not is missing, a drifting sets in that robs you of your capacity for judgement. That is precisely the intention. A society without a concept of truth cannot distinguish, cannot object, cannot judge.
Confucius put it 2,500 years ago with a sharpness that has lost none of its relevance (Confucius, Lunyu): all disorder in the state arises from confusion or muddling of concepts. What he meant was no academic exercise. It is the observation that the crisis of truth is always a crisis of language — and that the crisis of language is always a crisis of thinking. When words no longer hold, when they no longer hit the phenomena they name, the entire framework of orientation collapses.
This shows itself in many places today. There is a systematic crisis of the word: word and deed diverge, word and reality drift apart. Sedative turns of phrase are fed into public discourse like mantras and produce a numbing effect — they undercut immediate perception and replace it with prefabricated interpretations. The contextual disclosure of these language patterns is a philosophical task more urgent today than ever before.
Schiller formulated the paradoxical sentence: only error is life, and truth is death (Schiller, 1802, Kassandra). What sounds at first like capitulation contains a deep observation. The living human being errs — that belongs to our nature. But error that presents itself as truth, that secures itself institutionally and punishes contradiction, is something else entirely. It is the opposite of living inquiry. It is rigidity. And rigidity is what Confucius meant by conceptual confusion: not honest ignorance, but the systematic conflation of words and reality.
How does philosophical truth-seeking differ from ideological truth-claims?
The decisive difference lies in one’s relation to one’s own logic. Whoever thinks ideologically already knows the answer before the question is asked. Whoever searches philosophically lets themselves be seized by the question without knowing in advance where it leads. It is the difference between a verdict handed down and an insight that breaks open within you.
Jochen Kirchhoff distinguished two fundamentally different models in his final conversations (cf. Kirchhoff, J., 2002, Die Anderswelt). The Western model of Enlightenment — born from Plato’s cave allegory (Plato, Republic, 514a–520a) — presupposes a jailer, someone who has caused the imprisonment. It gives truth-seeking a political character from the outset: who holds us captive? Who obscures reality? The Eastern model of awakening — rooted in Buddhist and Taoist tradition — knows no jailer. The human being is not locked up but asleep. Truth is not a hidden object that must be found. It is a state of consciousness one enters when the sleep begins to lift.
Both models carry a deep insight. But both can harden into ideology when they stop being questions and start being answers. The truther movement shows how the Enlightenment model turns into paranoia when it only searches for jailers. The rhetoric of awakening shows how the Eastern model turns into complacency when it no longer considers its own sleep. Philosophical truth-seeking differs from both in that it keeps the question open — even against itself.
Truth as encounter with reality
Giordano Bruno said that truth is alive only in the soul itself (Bruno, 1584, De la Causa, Principio et Uno). He meant something fundamental: truth is not a possession, not a document, not a text between two covers. It is a state of being touched by reality. Whoever reads a text and thinks they hold truth in their hands mistakes the signpost for what it points toward. Schopenhauer opened the same thought from another side when he showed that the world is at once representation and will (Schopenhauer, 1819, The World as Will and Representation) — that access to the depth of reality does not run through detached observation but through inner experience. Gandhi called his life’s work Satyagraha — holding fast to truth (Gandhi, 1927, The Story of My Experiments with Truth). The word itself reveals the stance: not truth as a weapon against others, but as a force that sustains the one who binds themselves to it.
This means: truth is not something you have. It is something you approach. The tireless, day-by-day pursuit of it is itself already a criterion. Truth does not fall from the sky, and even a revelation has a prehistory. Something must have happened within you before you reach that level — you must already have been inside the truth, to some degree, before you can recognise it. The ancient Greek thinker Empedocles put it this way: you can only know what you are (Empedocles, c. 450 BCE, Fragments).
And what is the first step? The question. Not the casually posed question, but the question that breaks open inside you — the question you undergo. It is the difference between a verbally expressed curiosity and an opening within you that you enter, one that puts everything you have known until now into question. What am I? Who am I? These primal questions cannot be asked rhetorically. They must arise from within.
The ethical core of the question of truth
Truth cannot be a compulsory event. To recognise this is itself already a deep insight into the nature of truth. When you understand that genuine insight can only arise from the I of the individual — that it cannot be forced from outside — you stop trying to coerce others into truth. The golden rule — not to do unto another what you would not have done unto you — is a cognitive effect that arises in people who earnestly strive for truth. Judgement and ethics cannot be separated from one another.
Manipulative rhetoric does not aim at arguments but at self-worth. Dark rhetoric produces agreement through fear of exposure — not through the persuasive force of the matter itself. This mechanism explains why entire societies accept things they could recognise as false with their own eyes. The question of truth is therefore also a question of courage: the courage to maintain your own view, to voice dissent in public, and to treat the spirit of the age with irony.
Nietzsche saw the instincts of decline ruling over the instincts of ascent in his era (Nietzsche, 1888, The Case of Wagner). The diagnosis has lost nothing of its relevance. But the answer is not a new ideology, not a new system, not a new meme that shouts louder than the old one. The answer lies in the patient, clarifying work on one’s own thinking — in the clarification of concepts that tests whether words correspond to the phenomena they name. In the philosophical accompaniment of a thinking process that does not seek to repair but to make clarity possible.
What remains
Truth is reality. There is not reality over here and truth over there — it is the same thing. Whoever lives in untruth lives in a pseudo-reality. Whoever begins to see through that pseudo-reality does so not by replacing one system with another, but by beginning to look more closely — to ask more precisely, to feel more precisely, to think more precisely. In great music, the conductor Celibidache said, when it truly succeeds, then it is true (Celibidache, 1985, Munich Music Seminars). That cannot be hammered into doctrine. Reality is finely built, and dogmatic pronouncements achieve nothing. What it needs are people willing to engage with its complexity rather than pressing it into formulas.
If you sense that neither the post-factual resignation nor the rhetoric of the great awakening captures your unease, that is not a lack of information. It is the beginning of a thinking that refuses to settle. Perhaps it is the start of a question worth carrying through. Philosophical consultation offers a space for that — not as an answer, but as accompaniment on a path that forms under your feet as you walk.
Sources
- Bruno, G. (1584). De la Causa, Principio et Uno. Venice.
- Celibidache, S. (1985). On Musical Phenomenology. Munich Music Seminars.
- Confucius (c. 500 BCE). Lunyu (Analects). Cited after XIII, 3.
- Empedocles (c. 450 BCE). Fragments. Cited after Diels/Kranz.
- Gandhi, M. (1927). The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- Kirchhoff, G. (2025). Der Kampf um die Wahrheit — Zwischen Postfaktischem und Erwachen. YouTube: Gwendolin Kirchhoff [9FjbfGsDsBg].
- Kirchhoff, J. (2002). Die Anderswelt: Eine Annäherung an die Wirklichkeit. Munich: Diederichs.
- Nietzsche, F. (1888). Der Fall Wagner. Leipzig: Naumann.
- Plato (c. 375 BCE). Republic (Politeia). Cited after 514a–520a.
- Schiller, F. (1802). Kassandra. In: Gedichte.
- Schopenhauer, A. (1819). Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Leipzig: Brockhaus.